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In this paper we account for the fact that Cournot equilibrium strategies in the sector under environ-
mental regulation depend on rmsinteraction in the permits market (and vice versa). In this context, we
show that the cost-e¤ective allocation of permits between rms must compensate the cost-rising strategies
exercised by the stronger rm (in the output market). Then, taking into account the previous result, we
use a simulation to obtain the optimal allocation of permits between rms as a function of output market
characteristics, in particular as a function of goods substitutability that serves as an indicator for the de-
gree of price competition. The simulation allows us to determine how output market characteristics a¤ect
di¤erently optimal permit allocation depending on the regulators objective.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we investigate how strategic interaction in an olygopolistic output market may
a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of environmental regulation based on tradable emissions permits. With this
purpose, we assume that two Cournot producers of a (di¤erenciated) polluting good must comply
with environmental regulation by holding a tradable emission permit per unit of (non-abated)
pollution generated by goods production. This makes tradable emissions permits an essencial
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input. We model the interaction between the tradable emissions permits market (upstream) and
the output market (downstream) by considering the following three-stages game: in the rst stage,
one of the rms sets the price of permits alone; in the second stage permits are traded; and,
nally, in the third stage, rms compete à la Cournot in the (di¤erenciated) output market. Our
model follows Montero (2002) and the traditional theory on upstream-downstream interaction (from
Salinger, 1988 to Ordover, Salop and Saloner, 1990), assuming that the upstream (permits) market
is cleared rst. However, di¤erently from the latter, our model captures the nature of tradable
emissions permits markets by allowing rmsposition in the upstream market to be endogenous.
Our assumption regarding the fact that a rm has a rst-mover advantage over the other in the
permits market captures the fact that most permits markets created so far have been organized in
subsequent "phases": in a rst phase, only the most polluting rms receive tradable permits that
can be traded in the permits market, whereas, their less polluting competitors are only included in
a second phase (usually two to four years latter). This was the case in the EU Emission Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS), in the US Acid Rain Market and in the NOx budget program, among many
others. In this respect, Boemare and Quirion (2002) note that EU-ETS coverage is conned to a
limited number of sectors, and that there is no provision for voluntary "opt in" by rms below the
threshold size that assign rms to the rst phase. They argue that such "opt in" provisions could
help dilute any emerging market power.
The risk of market power in a tradable permits market covering more than one sector, like
the EU-ETS, seems smaller than in the case where only one olygopolistic sector is included1 or
in the case that one olygopolistic sector represents a big portion of the total permits market.
According to Kolstad and Wolak (2008), the olygopolistic rms participating in the Californian
electricity market (CAISO) behaved strategically in the Los Angeles market for NOx emissions
called RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market) to enhace their ability to exercise market
power in the CAISO. Such rms, shown to exhert unilateral market power in the CAISO by Wolak
(2003), were allocated 56% of total initial stock of permits. In the same line, Chen et al. (2006)
compute equilibrium behavior considering the interaction between the NOx budget program and
the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) electricity market. Due to the high concentration of
the PJM market2 , six large electricity generators alone account for 90% of emissions in the referred
permits market. Chen et al. (2006) nd that a Stackelberg leader with a long position in the
permits market could gain substantial prots by withholding permits and driving up permits costs
for rival producers.
The supporters of environmental regulation based on tradable emissions permits argue that the
1 In this respect Kolstad and Wolak (2008) argue that "although big fossil-fuel generation units produce a fraction
of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), they are likely to be early and substantial participants in any GHG emission
permits trading scheme". In the same line, Linares et al. (2006) argue that electricity generators represent more
than 50% of emissions covered by the EU-ETS market.
2 Its Herndahl-Hirschman Index was 0.154.
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creation of an emission permits market allows to reach the pollution reduction target (generally
called "the cap") in a cost-e¤ective manner (Montgomery, 1972) and with a minimum information
cost for the regulator (namely, concerning information regarding pollution abatement technologies).
This argument has been challenged, rst, by Hahns (1985) dominant-fringe model which argues that
the existence of market power reduces the cost-e¤ectiveness of tradable emissions permits because
a dominant rm manipulates the price of permits to reduce its own emission abatement costs.
Misiolek and Elder (1989), inspired in Salop and Sche¤man (1987), and Eshel (2005), also relying
on a dominant-fringe setting, show that technological linkages between permits and output markets
would give raise to rivals cost-rising strategies by the dominant rm, which would introduce an
additional type of market distortion. Fehr (1993) and Sartzetakis (1997) have also challenged the
e¤ectiveness of environmental regulation based on tradable emissions permits, showing that, in a
context of strategic interaction, emission permits markets could lead to monopolization or excessive
entry barriers. Although these two last papers have considered strategic interaction in the output
market, their objective is just to focus on the previously mentioned corner solutions instead of
assessing the e¤ects of strategic interaction on permits prices (or optimal permits allocation). In
fact, Fehr (1993) assumes that downstream rms buy permits for a given supply, whereas Sartzetakis
(1997) assumes a competitive permits market.
The empirical papersndings mentioned earlier in this introduction, together with the recent
discussion on "windfall" prots in oligopolies3 subject to environmental regulation based on tradable
emissions permits, suggest the need to account for the way this regulation a¤ects prots and rms
behaviour when the downstream market is olygopolistic. This paper wishes to contribute to the
literature on non-competitive emissions trading by accounting for an olygopolistic downstream
market and discussing how its characteristics determine the optimal permits allocation rule. In this
way, we are able to identify three di¤erent channels of market distortion. The rst market distortion
is due to market power in the permits market. Everything else the same, as in Hahn (1985), the rst-
mover in the permits market manipulates the price of permits to reduce its own environmental costs.
The other market distortions are related to rmsmarket power in the output market, which gives
both rms the incentives to underinvest in pollution abatement. By using permits for production,
rms become more competitive in the output market as they reduce their own marginal abatement
costs, while increasing their rivals marginal abatement costs. Di¤erently from the dominant-fringe
literatures ndings, we show how strategic interaction in the output market endows the follower
in the permits market to adopt rivals cost-rising strategies as well. In this context, we show how
the possibility of simultaneous adoption of rivals cost-rising strategies may either aggravate of
ameliorate the cost-e¤ectiveness of environmental regulation based on tradable emissions permits
markets4 . The net impact of the simultaneous adoption of rivals cost-rising strategies depends on
3The Arcelor-Mittal case in April 2009 is one example from the steel industry under the EU-ETS.
4 It is worth noting that the conclusions driven in this paper are only concerned with tradable emissions permits
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rmsposition in the permits market (buyer or seller) as well as on the interplay of rmsactions
in the output market.
In this line, we propose an optimal criterion to allocate permits between rms. We argue
that the specic features of this criterion are highly sensitive to (i) the regulators objective (cost-
e¤ectiveness of pollution abatement, maximization of rms prots, maximization of social wel-
fare,...); and (ii) the specic characteristics of the market, in particular the degree of substitution
between goods. The latter point underlines how, even if tradable emissions permits may lead to
cost-e¤ectiveness of pollution abatement (or any of the mentioned objetives), when the downstream
market is olygopolistic this cannot be done at the minnimum information cost.
2. BASIC SETUP
Consider a duopolistic market, in which rms (rm i and rm j) compete in quantities producing
imperfect substitute goods i and j. Quantity yk represents the production of good k = i; j, pk
represents its price and ck [yk] its production cost, with c0k [yk] > 0 and c
00
k [yk] > 0:
The production of goods i and j generates polluting emissions as a by-product. The parameter
 > 0 represents output polluting intensity. Firms are subject to environmental regulation based
on a cap and trade system. Under such environmental regulation, each rm must hold a number
of permits Ek equal to the amount of pollution yk emitted during production of yk: Then, this
regulation creates a scarce input, tradable permits, that are available up to the cap S: Then, the
total stock of permits S is allocated for free among rms. A percentage  is received by rm i and
a percentage (1  ) by rm j. The percentage  2 [0; 1] and the cap S are chosen exogenously by
the regulator, according to the pollution control target. In a framework where only polluting rms
trade in rights, the regulators decisions regarding the allocation of permits between rms and the
decision regarding the total cap on emissions can be analyzed independently (Eshel, 2005). In this
paper we restrict attention only to the allocation decision5 .
When the permits received for free, S and (1  )S respectively, do not coincide with the
emissions provoked by production of the optimal quantity of output yk, rms choose either to
regulation and cannot be extrapolated to other environmental regulation instruments like taxes or standards.
5The cap on pollution is generally xed by the regulatory authority with the help of experts -like the IPCC
1990 Scientic Assessment in the case of the Kyoto protocol and its european side agreement for the creation of
the EU-ETS- that state the impacts of pollution and the pollution reduction required to diminish those impacts to
an acceptable level. By creating property rights for an amount equal to the acceptable environmental damage, the
authority ensures that the marginal cost of pollution reduction (i.e. the property rights price) equals the marginal
benet of such reduction (i.e. the unit improvement in environmental quality).
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abate some of these emissions or to engage in permits trading. That is,
Ei = S   xi  0; (1)
Ej = (1  )S   xj  0; (2)
ak = yk   Ek  0; k = i; j; (3)
where xk denotes the amount of permits sold (when xk > 0) or bought (when xk < 0) by rm k;
and ak stands for the level of emissions abated. Abatement of polluting emissions is costly. To
abate ak polluting emissions, rm k has a cost of hk [ak] ; with h0k[ak] > 0 and h
00
k [ak] > 0:
In this regulatory framework, rms interact in two technologically-linked markets: the permits
market (upstream market) and the output market (downstream market). In the output market,
both rms exert some degree of market power since rms take their quantity decisions simultane-
ously. In the permits market, the degree of market power is asymmetric, with one of the rms (say
rm j) having a rst-mover advantage.
We model interaction in these technologically linked markets using a sequential game theoretical
approach. The players are the two rms, the payo¤s are rmsprots and strategies correspond
to the vector
 
q; Ei (q) ;
 
yi (q; Ei) ; y

j (q; Ei)

; with q 2 R+; Ei 2 R+; and yk 2 R+. The timing
of the game is the following: in the rst stage, rm j sets alone the price of permits (q); in the
second stage, rm i observes the posted price of permits (q) and chooses the amount of permits to
use for production (Ei) ; which determines the amount of permits to buy or sell (xi). Firm j clears
the permits market (xj =  xi) : Finally, in the third stage, given optimal use of permits (Ei) and
the corresponding optimal permits trade (xi), rms simultaneously interact in the output market,
strategically competing on quantities (yi and yj).
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
We rely on the notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) to investigate rmsoptimal
behavior. The optimization problem of rms in each stage is detailed in Apendix A.
Definition 1. The SPNE corresponds to the vector of strategies
 
q; Ei (q) ; y

i (q; Ei) ; y

j (q; Ei)

such that
(i) Given q and Ei; yi is the best response of rm i to yj and vice-versa;
(ii) Given yk (q; Ei) ; E

i (q) is the best response of rm i to q; and
(iii) Given yk (q; Ei) and E

i (q), q maximizes total prots of rm j:
5
We consider that goods are imperfect substitutes and inverse demand functions are such that:
@pi[yi; yj ]
@yi
<
@pi[yi; yj ]
@pj
< 0: (4)
According to the previous denition, in the last stage rms simultaneously choose the output
levels that solve problems (17) and (18), respectively. When considering linear6demands, the in-
terior7 equilibrium vector
 
yi (Ei; q) ; y

j (Ei; q)

is directly obtained from the system of rst order
conditions (FOCs8), i.e.:
pi[yi; yj ] +
@pi[yi;yj ]
@yi
yi = c
0
i[yi] + h
0
i[ai]
pj [yi; yj ] +
@pj [yi;yj ]
@yj
yj = c
0
j [yj ] + h
0
j [aj ]
: (5)
Given outcomes in the permits market and rivals output choice, in equilibrium each rm chooses
the equilibrium production level yk (Ei; q) for which there is a perfect balance between the marginal
revenue and the marginal cost (including abatement marginal costs).
According to equilibrium conditions (5), outcomes in the permits markets a¤ect output decisions
via marginal abatement costs. The following lemma summarizes this transmission mechanism.
Lemma 1. The larger the amount of permits used for production by rm k; the larger its equi-
librium output level and the lower the equilibrium output level for its rival  k. It follows:
@yk[Ek]
@Ek
> 0; (6)
@y k[Ek]
@Ek
< 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result in (6) is due to the fact that, the larger the amount of permits used for production by
rm k, the lower its abatement needs ak, the lower its marginal abatement costs h0k(ak); and there-
fore, the higher its output production. This direct e¤ect is reinforced by strategic substitutability
6By considering linear demand functions we ensure that second order e¤ects are zero, i.e. for each rm k it is the
case that
@2pk[yk;y k]
@y2
k
=
@2pk[yk;y k]
@yk@y k
=
@2pk[yk;y k]
@y2 k
= 0:
7Essentiatlly, we restrict our attention to the parameters for which the marginal revenue is higher than the
marginal cost when the strategic variable is equal to zero (q = 0; Ek = 0, yk = 0). When this is not the case,
equilibrium outcomes may correspond to corner solutions, in which rmsoptimal behavior may di¤er from the rst
order conditions derived in this paper. A su¢ cient condition to guarantee that we are in an interior solution is to
assume that, when yk = 0; it is the case that pk[yi; yj ] > c0k[yk] + h
0
k[yk] 8y k, independently of the rivals output
decision.
8Second order conditions are fullled as long as:
@2pk[yi;yj ]
@y2
k
yk   2 @pk[yi;yj ]@yk + c
0
k[yk] + 
0
k[ak]: In the case of
linear demands and strictly convex cost functions (production costs and abatement costs), this condition is always
met.
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of rmsoutput decisions. Accordingly, the result in (6) is independent of which of the two rival
rms is the most e¢ cient in terms of abatement.
In the second stage, rm i chooses the amount of permits to use for production (Ei) after
observing the price of permits (q). When deciding Ei; rm i anticipates the strategic interaction
that will take place in the output market. Therefore, when deciding Ei, rm i takes into account the
marginal protability of permits transactions (q   h0i[ai]) as well as the impact of Ei in the output
market outcome. In the interior equilibrium, Ei [q] is obtained from the rst order condition
9 to
problem (15), that is,
dpi [Ei]
dEi
yi [Ei] + 

i [Ei]
@yi
@Ei
= q   h0i[yi [Ei]]; (7)
with i [Ei] = p

i [Ei]  c0i[yi [Ei]]  h0i[yi [Ei]] and dpidEi =
@pi
@yi
@yi [Ei]
@Ei
+ @pi@yj
@yj [Ei]
@Ei
:
In equilibrium, Ei [q] is such that rm i does not have any opportunity to increase its total
prots by trading-o¤ output prots by prots due to permits transactions. More precisely, in
equilibrium, any variation in the prots from permits transactions caused by a marginal variation
of Ei (equal to q   h0i, in the RHS of (7)) is perfectly o¤set by an equivalent variation in output
prots (which is given by the LHS of (7)).
Lemma 2. For a given price of permits q, rm i always abates less than e¢ ciently. The di¤er-
ence between permits price and marginal abatement costs is given by:
q   h0i[Ei] =
@pi
@yj
@yj [Ei]
@Ei
yi [Ei] > 0: (8)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The lemma shows that, in a scenario of strategic interaction in the output market, abatement
decisions of rm i are such that q > h0i[Ei]:Accordingly, in equilibrium, rm i always abates less
than what a competitive rm would abate. Firm i strategically chooses to forego prots from
permits transactions to benet from a better position in relation to its rival in the output market.
Due to strategic interaction in the output market, despite being a price-taker in the permits market,
rm i is able to use its decisions concerning Ei to reduce its overall marginal costs, while increasing
its rival marginal costs (since the rival is responsible for clearing the permits market). Firm i is
then able to increase its market share in the output market, obtaining higher output prots than
the prot level corresponding to the choice of Ei that leads to q = h0i.
9Our analysis is valid when the second order condition @
2i [Ei;q]
@E2i
< 0 holds, i.e. when:
2
@yi
@Ei
dpi
dEi
< c00i

@yi
@Ei
2
+

1   @y

i
@Ei
2
h00i :
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Finally, in the rst stage, rm j quotes the price q that solves the following rst order condition:
q   x

i [q]
@Ei [q]
@q
  h0j =  

dpj
dEi
yj + 

j [E

i [q]]
@yj
@Ei

: (9)
where we still focus exclusively on interior solutions.
The equilibrium price of permits q that satises (9) guarantees that rm j is exploiting all
existing prot opportunities (considering the permits market as well as the output market). In
equilibrium, variations in output prots induced by marginal variations in q (given by the RHS
in condition (9)) are exactly compensated by variations in the prots associated with permits
transactions (given by the LHS in condition (9)).
Lemma 3. Everything else the same, strategic competition in output quantities leads to a permits
price that may be either higher or lower than the e¢ cient one bq = h0j. In equilibrium, the di¤erence
between the price of permits and the marginal abatement cost of rm j is equal to:
q   h0j =
xi [q]
@Ei [q]
@q
  @pj [yi; yj ]
@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj [Ei[q]]: (10)
Proof. See the Appendix.
According to (10), we could observe a price of permits q equal to h0j only by chance. The
di¤erence between q and h0j can be decomposed in two e¤ects. The rst contribution to the
di¤erence between permits price and marginal abatement costs is due to the market power of rm
j in the permits market (this corresponds to x

i [q]
@E
i
[q]
@q
in condition (10)). Focusing exclusively on this
e¤ect, condition (10) implies that, everything else the same, when rm j is a net-seller of permits
(xi < 0), it enjoys a positive mark-up over h
0
j as a result of its rst mover advantage in the permits
market. In contrast, when rm j is a net-buyer of permits (xi > 0) ; rm j will mark down permits
price (price discount).
Besides the market power exerted by rm j in the permits market, there is an additional e¤ect
that contributes to the di¤erence between price of permits q and its marginal abatement costs
h0j :This additional source of ine¢ ciency corresponds to the positive term  @pj [yi;yj ]@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj > 0 in
condition (10). Independently of rmsposition in the permits market, the latter e¤ect derives from
the technological link that exists between the permits market and the output market and is always
positive. All the rest being equal, rm j has incentives to make permits more expensive for its rival
i, reducing rm i0s output production, while increasing its own market share in the output market.
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4. COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT
From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, it follows that market mechanisms based on tradable emissions
permits may not entail an e¢ cient allocation of abatement e¤orts between rms.
This result is in line with previous literature. In a dominant-fringe setting, Hahn (1985) shows
how market power in the permits market could damages cost-e¤ectiveness in pollution abatement.
Also using a dominant-fringe setting, Misiolek and Elder (1989) and Eshel (2005), among others,
have suggested that the cost-e¤ectiveness in pollution abatement could also be a¤ected by dominant
rmsability to use emission permits to raise rivalscosts. These two e¤ects correspond to the e¤ects
described in Lemma 3.
However, in the context of our model, even when rm i is a price taker in the permits market,
strategic interaction in the output markets creates a new e¤ect, which a priori might either aggravate
or ameliorate the cost-e¤ectiveness of abatement e¢ ciency. This e¤ect stems from the fact that we
observe cost-rising strategies also in the case of rm i (see Lemma 2). More precisely, in equilibrium,
we obtain that
h0i[a

i ]  h0j [ai ] =
xi [q]
@Ei [q]
@q
+
S0

 @pj
@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj

>0
+

 @pi
@yj
@yj
@Ei
yi

<0
: (11)
According to (11), the equilibrium di¤erential between rmsabatement costs can be decom-
posed in three e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is given by x

i [q]
@E
i
[q]
@q
and it stems from rm j0s market power
in the permits market (Hahn, 1985). The second e¤ect is given by  @pj@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj and it stems from
rm j0s ability to use its decision regarding the price of permits to raise rm i0s marginal costs.
This e¤ect is equivalent to the output market e¤ect emphasized in the dominant-fringe literature,
since rm j is also strategic in the output market. Finally, the third e¤ect is given by   @pi@yj
@yj
@Ei
yi
and stems from rm is ability to use its decision regarding permitsuse to raise rm j0s marginal
costs, i.e. to compensate the previous e¤ects. This third e¤ect due to strategic interaction in the
output market was not considered in previous literature, like Misiolek and Elder (1989) or Eshel
(2005). Whether this third e¤ect aggravates or ameliorates cost-e¤ectiveness of abatement depends
on rmsposition in the permits market, as well as on the interplay of rms in the permits market
and in the output market.
When rm j is a net-seller of permits, permits are always over-priced10 (q > h0j). Ceteris
paribus, the higher price of permits induces a reduction in permits demanded by rm i due to a
10When rm j is a net-seller of permits, permits are over-priced for two reasons: according to (10), on the one
hand, there is the output market e¤ect corresponding to   @pj [yi;yj ]
@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj > 0 and, on the other hand, there is an
addicional mark-up of (
S Ei [q])
@E
i
[q]
@q
due to rm is market power in the permits market (rst mover advantage).
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move along rm i0s demand of permits. But rm i is also strategic. As described in Lemma 2,
rm i0s strategic behavior shifts permitsdemand upwards, o¤setting (at least partially) the market
distortion associated with the market power of rm j: However, when rm i0s strategic inuence
in this market is very strong (i.e. @pi@yj
@yj
@Ei
yi is very large), this e¤ect may yield instead market
distortions with an opposite nature, i.e. with rm iunder-investing in pollution abatement (such
that h0i[a

i ] < h
0
j [a

i ])
11 even more than rm j.
The previous analysis remains valid when rm j is a net buyer of permits but rm j0s market
power in the permits market is relatively limited and its incentives to adopt a raising rivals costs
strategy more than compensate the incentives to mark-down permits price, i.e. x

i [q]
@E
i
[q]
@q
  @pj@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj >
0:
When rm j is a net buyer of permits and it exerts a substantial degree of market power in the
permits markets, permits prices are under-priced, i.e. the rst term in the RHS of (10) is higher in
absolute value that the second term.
Ceteris paribus, this yields a downward move along rm is supply of permits. In this case, rm
i0s strategic e¤ect aggravates the market distortion provoked by rm j by shifting supply of permits
upward, which makes the di¤erence in (11) larger.
To the light of the previous results, we conclude that market mechanisms alone may not (and in
general do not) lead to cost-e¤ectiveness of pollution abatement. The extent to which rmsdeviate
from the cost-e¤ective pollution abatement solution depends on rmsinitial permitsendowments,
together with the incentives for rising rivals costs. Therefore, for a given cap on permits (S) ; the
regulator may use the allocation of permits among rms () as a policy instrument to reestablish the
cost-e¢ cient result or to promote welfare-enhancing policies. Such choice depends on the regulators
objective. The policy implications of our results are analyzed with further detail in the next section.
5. REGULATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This section investigates how the environmental regulator may rely on his decision regarding
rmsinitial endowment of permits to restablish cost-e¤ectiveness in the allocation of abatement
e¤orts between rms. Afterwards, we consider a broader regulatory objective, investigating the
impact of permits allocation rules on total social welfare.
From Lemma 2, we conclude that strategic interaction in the output market results in an upward
shift of rm i0s demand (or supply) of permits, which allows rm i to under-invest in pollution
abatement, for any given price of permits. Depending on the interplay between the market power
in the permits market and the incentive to adopt a rivals cost-raising strategy, rm j might be
interested in under-invest or over-invest in pollution abatement.
11From a theoretical point of view, such situation may occur. Nevertheless, there should be a considerable degree
of asymmetry between rms so that rm i0s strategic e¤ect in the output market more than compensates rm j0s
strategic e¤ect in the output market as well as its market power in the permits market.
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Proposition 1. A regulator is able to use the permitsallocation rule to restore cost-e¤ectiveness
of pollution abatement. The cost e¤ective allocation rule
 
CE

is implicitly given by the value of
 which solves:
@pj
@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj +
@pi
@yj
@yj
@Ei
yi =
SCE   Ei [q]
@Ei [q]
@q
: (12)
The sign of the LHS of (12) is a priori undetermined. If the e¤ect of rm i0s cost-raising
strategy dominates the e¤ect of rm j0s cost-raising strategy, i.e. @pi@yj
@yj
@Ei
yi >  @pj@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj ; when
the cost-e¤ective allocation rule is applied by the regulator, rm j must end up being a net seller
of permits to eliminate rm i0s incentive to overuse emission permits in production. In contrast,
when @pi@yj
@yj
@Ei
yi <  @pj@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj ; the LHS of (12) is negative, and therefore, the e¤ect of rm j
0s
cost-raising strategy by itself is more than enough to compensate the e¤ect inherent to rm i0s
cost-raising strategy. To avoid under-investment in pollution abatement by rm j; the regulator
must allocate permits in such a way that rm j becomes a net-buyer of permits so that its market
power in the permits market partially o¤sets its cost-raising strategy in the output market.
However, the cost-e¤ectiveness of pollution abatement may not be the only aspect that the
regulator considers when deciding permitsallocation rules. In fact, given the technological linkages
between permits and output markets, we observe that outcomes in the output market are also
a¤ected by the regulators choices with respect to the permits allocation.
In particular, along the equilibrium path, the output level of the rm receiving more permits
increases while the output of the rm receiving less permits decreases:
@yi
@
> 0 and
@yj
@
< 0 (13)
The mechanism behind this result is the following: rst, an increases of  leads to a decreases
in permitsprice. This reduction of permits price entails a downward move along rm i0s demand
of permits (or supply of permits, if rm i is a net-seller of permits), which entails an increase in
the use of permits for production by rm i: As a consequence, rm i0s marginal abatement costs
are lower than before, yielding an increase in rm i0s output production. The opposite occurs to
rm j; that looses market share after an increase of . The impact on total output and consumers
welfare depends on whether the increase of yk more than compensates the decrease of y k after the
variation of :
The cost-e¤ective permits allocation rule (CE) fails to internalize this type of considerations. In
fact, optimal allocation rules may change considerably depending on the regulators objective. Some
examples of possible objectives to be pursued by the regulator are: abatement cost-e¤ectiveness,
maximization of joint prots, maximization of consumerssurplus (even with some preference over
some type of consumers), maximization of total welfare, or other. Depending on the scope of the
regulators activity and the specic objective pursued by the regulator, there may be contradictory
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recommendations regarding the optimal allocation rule :
In the following section we introduce an example that illustrates the previous point. In partic-
ular, the following section shows how output demand characteristics inuences optimal allocation
of permits between rms.
6. THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTPUT DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS
To illustrate how sensitive optimal allocation rules may be both in relation to the specic
characteristics of the industry under regulation and to the objective pursued by the regulator,
consider an industry with the following characteristics: (i) the inverse demand for good k is given
by pk[yk; y k] = 25 + "j   2yk   y k; with 0 <  < 2 and "j = 0:1 if k = j; (ii) rmsproduction
technology is similar, with ck [yk] =
(yk)
2
4 ; (iii) the intensity of pollution is equal to  = 0:8; (iv)
the total stock of emission permits is exogenously xed by the regulator to meet the pollution
control target and we consider it to be S = 3; which constrains rmsproduction plans. Finally,
(v) rmsabatement technologies are given by hi[ai] =
1:1(ai)
2
2 and hj [aj ] =
(aj)
2
2 : From (v) follows
that the rst-mover in the permits market (rm j) owns a more e¢ cient abatement technology,
even if the degree of asymmetry between rmsabatement technologies is rather limited. This is
in line with Hahn (1985) and Eshel (2005), among others, that dene the dominant rm in their
dominant-fringe setting as the rm with the lowest marginal abatement cost function.
In this context, we compute the equilibrium outcomes as in Section 3 but now considering the
specic functions detailed in points (i) to (v). We then illustrate the degree of output substitutabil-
ity, as a measure of competition between rms in the output market, as well as the objective pursued
by the regulator, a¤ect optimal allocation rules. Regarding, the impact of output substitutability,
we compute optimal allocation rules for progressively higher degrees of substitutability between
goods, comparing outcomes for  = 0:01;  = 0:4;  = 1:5; and  = 1:99. Concerning the impact
of the objective pursued by the regulator, we compare optimal allocation rules under four di¤erent
regulatory objectives: (i) cost-e¤ectiveness of abatement e¤ort (CE); (ii) maximization of rms
joint prots (JP ); and, nally, (iii) maximization of total social welfare (W ). Regarding the way
we compute consumers surplus to be able to consider it when calculating social welfare, we use the
partial equilibrium analysis from Belleamme and Peitz (2010). Table 1 summarizes our results:
Reading each line separately, we conclude that the optimal allocation of permits varies according
to the regulators objective. When the regulator wants to promote cost-e¤ectiveness of pollution
abatement (CE), he voluntary chooses to ignore the impact of permits decisions on the output
market. Table 1 shows that, under a cost-e¤ective allocation rule, the regulator must allocate more
permits to the rm that owns the less e¢ cient abatement technology. Since in this example we con-
sider h0j < h
0
i, the asymmetric allocation in favor of rm i is needed to reduce its abatement needs
(in comparison to rm j0s abatement needs) up to the point in which h0i[a

i ] = h
0
j [a

j ]: In relation to
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Substitution CE JP W
 = 0:01 CE = 54:1% 

JP = 54% 

W = 69%
 = 0:4 CE = 54:4% 

JP = 53% 

W = 61%
 = 1:5 CE = 54:9% 

JP = 51% 

W = 60%
 = 1:99 CE = 55:2% 

JP = 51% 

W = 60%
TABLE 1
Optimal permits allocation as a function of substituibility according to regulatory objective
the way output market characteristics inuence the cost-e¤ective allocation rule, as sustituability
decreases, rising-rivals cost strategies are weaker (due to less competition) and therefore the lower
must be the compensation (through a higher permits allocation) to the less e¢ cient rm. However,
the cost-e¤ective allocation rule is not very sensitive to changes in the degree of output substitua-
bility. This is due to the fact that the latter only a¤ects the former indirectly, i.e. through the e¤ect
that a change in output substitutability has on output production, and consequently in abatement
needs.
Turning now to the maximization of joint prots (JP), the optimal allocation of permits once
more favours the least e¢ cient rm i: This is the case because, when giving more permits to the least
e¢ cient rm, the increase in its output production (and its revenues) more than compensates the
decrease in its rivals production (and prots). The changes in the prot-maximizing allocation as
substituability changes are stronger than in the cost-e¤ective allocation. In particular, we observe
that, as substituability decreases, rm is increase in production (and prots) after an increase in 
(keep in mind equation (13)) is accompaigned by a smaller decrease in js production (and prots).
Then, the lower the substitution between goods, the higher the amount of permits that should be
allocated to the less e¢ cient rm.
Finally, the welfare maximizing (W) allocation rule gives even more permits to the least e¢ cient
rm than the prot maximizing allocation rule. This is the case because the latter only accounts
for the fact that the increase in the least e¢ cient rms output production after an increase in 
more than compensates the decrease in the most e¢ cient rms output production. Instead, the
welfare maximizing allocation rule additionally accounts for the fact that the mentioned changes
in quantities also a¤ect prices and consequently consumers surplus. In particular, the negative
variation in the least e¢ cient rms price pi (thin line in Figure 1) more than compensates the
positive variation in the most e¢ cient rms price pj : These price changes make consumers better-
o¤ as  increases.
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Figure 1: Output prices as a function of :
Concerning the impact of output substitutability on the welfare-maximizing allocation rule, we
nd that as the substituability between goods decreases, the higher the gap between the negative
variation of pi with an increase in  and the positive variation of p

j with an increase in :As a
result, as substituability decreases, the higher it must be the fraction of permits allocated to rm i
to compensate the fact that pi is higher than p

j (due to higher marginal abatement costs).
It is worth noting that the amount of permits allocated to the least e¢ cient rm increases as we
move rightwise in Table 1. This is because, when giving more permits to the least e¢ cient rm, the
cost-e¤ective allocation rule takes into account the benet in terms of cost minimization while the
prot-maximizing allocation takes into account, additionally, the positive e¤ect on overall quantity
produced and, nally, the welfare-maximizing allocation additionally considering the benets for
consumers in terms of lower prices due to the latter increase in production.
The analysis regarding the regulatory possibilities as a function of goods substituability becomes
particularly relevant when thinking of environmental policy that may a¤ect the redistribution of
production between goods and, through that redistribution, may harm least favoured consumers.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have investigated how strategic interaction in the output market together with market power
in the permits market may a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of environmental regulation based on tradable
emissions permits. We propose a model of upstream-downstream competition, whose major features
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are the following: (i) explicit consideration of the technological linkages between the permits market
(upstream) and the output market (downstream); (ii) strategic interaction in the output market,
with rms competing à la Cournot; and (iii) market power in the permits market.
In line with previous literature dealing with the impact of market power on the e¤ectiveness of
environmental regulation based on tradable emissions permits, we also conclude that emission per-
mits markets may lead to outcomes that di¤er from the cost-e¤ective pollution abatement solution.
Besides market distortions associated with market power in the permits market (as in Hahn,
1985) and market distortions associated with the possibility of having a dominant rm adopting
rivals cost-rising strategies (as in Misiolek and Elder, 1989 and Eshel, 2005), we show that strategic
interaction in the output market may give raise to an additional source of market distortion. This
market distortion is associated with the possibility that a follower in the permits market (exerting
some degree of market power in the output market) may adopt a rivals cost-rising strategy as well.
The net e¤ect of the three market distortions is a priori unknown. Strategic e¤ects associated
with followerscost-rising strategies might ameliorate or aggravate the cost-e¤ectiveness of emission
permits markets but it may as well aggravate it, depending on the interplay of rmsactions in
the permits and in the output market, as well as on rmsposition in the permits market (buyer/
seller of permits). Since rmsposition in the permits market is directly related to rms initial
endowments of permits, to the light of the regulators specic objective, it is possible to design
optimal allocation rules that restore cost-e¤ectiveness (or achieves another policy objective).
In relation to the design of optimal allocation rules, this paper highlights that the optimal
allocation rule may be extremely sensitive to the specic characteristics of the output market, in
particular to goods substituability. Then, in line with Sartzetakis (1997), this paper emphasizes
that the regulator is often faced with extremely demanding information needs.
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8. APPENDIX
Appendix A
In the rst stage, rm j quotes the price of permits (q) that solves the following optimization
problem
max
q
fpjyj   cj [yj ] + q (Ei   S)  hj [yj   S + Ei]g (14)
s.t.
pj = p

j [E

i [q]];
yj = y

j [E

i [q]];
Ei = E

i [q];
q  0:
where (i) xj =  xi = Ei S corresponds to the amount of permits sold (or bought, when xj < 0)
by rm j; and (ii) aj = yj   S + Ei corresponds to the amount of polluting emissions abated12
by rm j:
In the second stage, rm i observes q and chooses the part of polluting emissions it wishes to
cover with permits Ei by solving the following optimization problem.
max
Ei
fpiyi   ci[yi] + q (S   Ei)  hi[yi   Ei]g (15)
s.t.
pi = p

i [Ei];
yi = y

i [Ei];
Ei  0:
where (i) xi = S Ei corresponds to the amount of permits sold (or bought, when xi < 0) by rm
i; and (ii) ai = yi   Ei corresponds to the amount of polluting emissions abated by rm i: The
solution to problem (15) denes the equilibrium level of permits used for production conditional
on permits price, Ei [q]: The choice of Ei will then determine the amount of permits to buy. The
amount of permits traded in equilibrium, conditional on permits price is equal to:
xi [q] =  xj [q] = S   Ei [q]: (16)
Finally, in the third stage, given rmschoices regarding optimal use of permits for production
and the consequent amount of permits bought or sold, rms strategically compete à la Cournot in
12From the market clearing condition, xi =  xj : Since xi = S   Ei and xj = (1   )S   Ej ; we obtain that
Ei + Ej = S and, accordingly, aj = yj   Ej can be written as aj = yj   S + Ei:
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the output market. Given q and Ei[q]; the equilibrium vector
 
yi [Ei; q]; y

j [Ei; q]

simultaneously
solves the following optimization problems:
max
yi
fpiyi   ci[yi] + q (S   Ei)  hi[yi   Ei]g ; (17)
s:t:
yi  0
max
yj
fpjyj   cj [yj ] + q (Ei   S)  hj [yj   S + Ei]g ; (18)
s:t:
yj  0
Relying on backward induction techniques, the previous optimization problems can be solved se-
quentially starting from the last stage of interaction. In our analysis, we focus exclusively on interior
solutions, in which the rst order conditions lead to yk > 0; E

k > 0; and a

k > 0. The variable xk
can be positive or negative. When rm k is a net seller of permits, it follows xk > 0: Conversely,
when rm k is a net buyer of permits, xk < 0:
Proof of Lemma 1
The rst order conditions in (5) correspond to rms best response functions yi[Ei; yj ] and
yj [Ei; yi]: These functions dene rms optimal output conditional on the strategy of the rival.
To compute the derivatives @y

i [Ei]
@Ei
and
@yj [Ei]
@Ei
; one must take into account the direct e¤ect of
Ei (directly incorporated in rmsbest response functions) but also the indirect e¤ect of Ei; which
a¤ects rmsdecisions through the output decision of the rival (the so-called strategic e¤ect13).
More precisely, the derivatives can be obtained from rmsbest response functions as follows:
@yi [Ei]
@Ei
=
@yi[Ei;yj ]
@Ei
+
@yi[Ei;yj ]
@yj
@yj [Ei;yi]
@Ei
1  @yi[Ei;yj ]@yj
@yj [Ei;yi]
@yi
; (19)
@yj [Ei]
@Ei
=
@yj [Ei;yi]
@Ei
+
@yj [Ei;yi]
@yi
@yi[Ei;yj ]
@Ei
1  @yj [Ei;yi]@yi
@yi[Ei;yj ]
@yj
; (20)
where the application of the theorem of the implicit function to the rst order conditions allows us
to obtain the derivatives @yi[Ei;yj ]@Ei ;
@yj [Ei;yi]
@Ei
;
@yi[Ei;yj ]
@yj
; and @yj [Ei;yi]@yi .
13For a rigorous di¤erentiation between direct e¤ect and strategic e¤ect, see Tirole (1988).
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Conditions in system (5) dene two equalities: i(Ei; yi; yj) = 0 and j (Ei; yi; yj) = 0; where:(
i (Ei; yi; yj) = pi[yi; yj ] +
@pi[yi;yj ]
@yi
yi   c0i[yi]  h0i[ai]
j (Ei; yi; yj) = pj [yi; yj ] +
@pj [yi;yj ]
@yj
yj   c0j [yj ]  h0j [aj ]
(21)
By the theorem of the implicit function:
@yi[Ei; yj ]
@Ei
=  
@i(Ei;yi;yj)
@Ei
@i(Ei;yi;yj)
@yi
=   h
00
i
@2i(yi;yj ;Ei)
@y2i
> 0; (22)
with @
2i(yi;yj ;Ei)
@y2i
= 2
@pi[yi;yj ]
@yi
  c00i   2h00i < 0:
Similarly, the derivative:
@yi[Ei; yj ]
@yj
=  
@i(Ei;yi;yj)
@yj
@i(Ei;yi;yj)
@yi
=  
@pi[yi;yj ]
@yj
@2i(yi;yj ;Ei)
@y2i
; (23)
which is negative due to the negative denominator (second order conditions) and the negative
numerator (given the properties of the demand functions). In the light of the negative sign of the
derivative @yi[Ei;yj ]@yj , rmsdecisions are strategic substitutes, which is always the case in the context
of quantity competition. In addition, we observe
 1 < @yi[Ei; yj ]
@yj
< 0; (24)
given that
@2i(yi;yj ;Ei)@y2i  > @pi[yi;yj ]@yj  :
The derivative
@yj [Ei; yi]
@Ei
=  
@j(Ei;yi;yj)
@Ei
@j(Ei;yi;yj)
@yj
=
h00j
@2j(yi;yj ;Ei)
@y2j
; (25)
which is negative.
Concerning strategic substitutability of quantity decisions, we obtain:
@yj [Ei; yi]
@yi
=  
@j(Ei;yi;yj)
@yi
@j(Ei;yi;yj)
@yj
=  
@pj [yi;yj ]
@yi
@2j(yi;yj ;Ei)
@y2j
; (26)
with  1 < @yj [Ei;yi]@yi < 0:
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In the light of the signs of the previous derivatives we obtain that
@yi [Ei]
@Ei
=
@yi[Ei;yj ]
@Ei
+
+
@yi[Ei; yj ]
@yj
@yj [Ei; yi]
@Ei| {z }
+
1  @yi[Ei; yj ]
@yj
@yj [Ei; yi]
@yi| {z }
+
> 0: (27)
Similarly,
@yj [Ei]
@Ei
=
@yj [Ei;yi]
@Ei 
+
@yj [Ei; yi]
@yi
@yi[Ei; yj ]
@Ei| {z }
 
1  @yj [Ei; yi]
@yi
@yi[Ei; yj ]
@yj| {z }
+
< 0; (28)
as stated in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
From the rst order condition in (5) follows that:
i [Ei] = pi[yi; yj ]  c0i[yi]  h0i[ai] =  
@pi[yi; yj ]
@yi
yi: (29)
Replacing i [Ei] by  @pi[yi;yj ]@yi yi in (7), we obtain:
q   h0i[yi [Ei]] =
dpi [Ei]
dEi
yi [Ei] +

 @pi[yi; yj ]
@yi
yi

@yi
@Ei
: (30)
Introducing in the previous equationdp

i [Ei]
dEi
= @pi@yi
@yi
@Ei
+ @pi@yj
@yj
@Ei
where, for the sake of simplicity, we
denote pi[yi; yj ] as pi, it follows that:
q   h0i[yi [Ei]] =

@pi
@yi
@yi
@Ei
+
@pi
@yj
@yj
@Ei

yi [Ei] +

 @pi
@yi
yi

@yi
@Ei
; (31)
which simplies to
q   h0i[yi [Ei]] =
@pi
@yj
@yj
@Ei
yi [Ei] (32)
as stated in Lemma 2:
Since (i) @pi@yj < 0; (ii)
@yj
@Ei
< 0; and (iii) yi [Ei] > 0; it follows that for E

i [q] : q > h
0
i[y

i [Ei]]:
Proof of Lemma 3
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From the rst order condition in (5) follows that:
j [Ei] = pj [yi; yj ]  c0j [yj ]  h0j [aj ] =  
@pj [yi; yj ]
@yj
yj : (33)
Replacing j [Ei] by  @pj [yi;yj ]@yj yj in (9), and introducing
dpj [Ei]
dEi
=
@pj
@yi
@yi
@Ei
+
@pj
@yj
@yj
@Ei
; we obtain:
q   (S   E

i [q])
@Ei [q]
@q
  h0j =  
@pj
@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj ; (34)
with  @pj@yi
@yi
@Ei
yj > 0:
Proof of (13)
Applying the chain rule, the derivatives @y

k
@ can be decomposed as follows:
@yk
@
=
@yk[q; Ei]
@Ei
@Ei [q]
@q
@q
@
; (35)
where the derivatives @y

k[q;Ei]
@Ei
have already been obtained in Lemma , with @y

k[Ek]
@Ek
> 0;and
@y k[Ek]
@Ek
< 0: Accordingly, it remains to obtain @E

i [q]
@q and
@q
@ . The derivative
@Ei [q]
@q can be
directly obtained from the application of the theorem of the implicit function to the rst order
condition associated with problem (15). Let us re-write this rst order condition as i(Ei; q) = 0;
where the function i(Ei; q) is given by:
i(Ei; q) =
dpi [Ei]
dEi
yi [Ei] + 

i [Ei]
@yi
@Ei
  q + h0i[yi [Ei]]: (36)
From the theorem of the implicit function it follows that:
@Ei
@q
=  
@i(Ei;q)
@q
@i(Ei;q)
@Ei
=    1
@2i (Ei;q)
@2Ei
< 0; (37)
where @
2
i (Ei;q)
@2Ei
is necessarily negative due to the second order conditions associated with problem
(15). Accordingly @E

i
@q < 0; which means that the higher permitsprice, the less permits rm i
uses in production (and therefore the more polluting emissions must be abated in order to maintain
output production).
Analogously, the derivative @q

@ can be directly obtained from the application of the theorem of
the implicit function to the rst order condition associated with problem (14). First, re-write the
rst order condition as j (q; ) = 0; where:
j (q; ) =
@Ei [q]
@q

q   h0j +
dpj
dEi
yj + 

j [E

i [q]]
@yj
@Ei

  (S   Ei [q]) : (38)
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Now, apply the theorem of the implicit function, obtaining:
@q
@
=  
@j(q;)
@
@j(q;)
@q
=    S
@2j(q;)
@q2
: (39)
This derivative is negative since the second order conditions associated with problem (14) require
the denominator to be negative.
Accordingly, along the equilibrium path
@yi
@
=
@yi [q; Ei]
@Ei
+
@Ei [q]
@q
 
@q
@ 
> 0; (40)
and
@yj
@
=
@yi [q; Ei]
@Ei 
@Ei [q]
@q
 
@q
@ 
< 0: (41)
As stated in (13) after a marginal variation of ; the equilibrium output of rm i changes in the
same direction, while the equilibrium output of rm j changes in the opposite direction. 
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